The ruling
Directive of the Minister of the Interior of 3 November 2026, replacing art. 3 of the directive of 19 May 2022 laying down the criteria for the organisation and management of pre-removal detention centres. Text not published in the Official Gazette nor in the Amministrazione trasparente section of the Ministry's website, where the 2022 directive and the circular that transmitted it can be found (checked on 9 November 2026); content reconstructed from the passages reported in the press from 4 to 6 November 2026
“The unavoidable duty to introduce comprehensive rules laying down, in the abstract and in general for all detained persons, content and procedures that limit the discretion of the administration”
Constitutional Court, judgment no. 96 of 2025, on the legislature's duty to regulate the manner of detention; among the matters indicated by the Court is the provision of health care.
General administrative acts on the website of the Ministry of the Interior
What the directive provides
Until 3 November the rule was clear. Art. 3 of the 2022 directive required that a foreign national be admitted to the centre only after an examination by a doctor of the local health authority or hospital, whose task was to establish the absence of evident conditions making admission to and stay in the facility incompatible: contagious infectious diseases, psychiatric disorders, acute or chronic degenerative conditions that cannot be treated in a closed community, as well as the conditions of vulnerability listed in art. 17 of d.lgs. n. 142 del 2015, including serious illnesses and mental disorders. The certificate was placed in the person's file and submitted to the judge responsible for validation and extension. It was an imperfect filter, often reduced to a formality, as associations, doctors and ombudspersons have documented over the years; but it was a filter, and it had a precise purpose: to establish whether that person could be deprived of liberty without harm to their health.
The new directive, as far as can be seen from the published passages, changes the purpose of the examination. The doctor no longer has to say whether the person is compatible with detention, but to record their state of health through the medical history or symptoms and the available documentation, in order to identify the care needs to be met through the managing body or the local health authority. Where the examination has not been possible, the person is nonetheless admitted to the centre and the examination must take place within twenty-four hours of admission. The form, completed on a ministerial template, is sent in a sealed envelope to the managing body's doctor; the centre's police office keeps only a summary assessment, which may be transmitted to the judicial authority on request. The managing body's doctor may only report cases in which health conditions, because of their seriousness, cannot be managed within the facility. Health records are withheld from third parties, with the sole exceptions of the judicial authority, defence counsel, the health authorities and the United Nations anti-torture body. The second examination, carried out inside the centre by the managing body's doctor, is also entrusted with looking for signs of trauma, sexual or gender-based violence and torture, once detention has already begun.
The Minister put it bluntly: any negative opinion by the doctor will no longer be binding so as to prevent detention. In practice, the decisive question, whether this person can be locked up without putting their health at risk, is no longer asked by anyone.
A directive that cannot be read
Even before the content, the manner is striking. The directive was announced by the Minister and reported by the newspapers, but it cannot be found on the institutional website of the Ministry of the Interior. In the Amministrazione trasparente section, among the general administrative acts, the directive of 19 May 2022 and the circular of 15 June 2022 by which it was transmitted to the prefectures and Questure are published. Of the amendment of 3 November 2026, which rewrites its most sensitive provision, there is no trace as of 9 November 2026.
It is not for us to attribute intentions. But publication is not a courtesy. Art. 12 of d.lgs. n. 33 del 2013 requires administrations to publish on their websites directives, circulars and any act that lays down general rules on procedures or provisions for the application of the law, and the directive on fitness examinations is exactly that. Anyone can request its publication through the civic access provided for by art. 5, comma 1, of the same decree, without having to give reasons. The 2022 precedent shows that the Ministry knows how to do it.
Silence has precise legal consequences. Art. 5 of the European Convention requires deprivation of liberty to have an accessible and foreseeable legal basis, and it was precisely for the lack of a clear legal basis that Italy was found in breach by the Grand Chamber in Khlaifia and Others v. Italy (2016). A rule on conditions of detention that detainees, their lawyers and judges can learn about only through press leaks is neither accessible nor foreseeable. And a health safeguard that can be changed without even publishing the new text shows better than any argument why the Constitution requires the manner of deprivation of liberty to be laid down by law.
A directive cannot repeal the law
The first defect is the most basic, and would be enough on its own. Art. 7, comma 5, of d.lgs. n. 142 del 2015 provides that applicants for international protection whose health or vulnerability is incompatible with detention may not be detained in the centres, and requires, within the centres' social and health services, periodic assessment of vulnerability. The provision is in force: d.l. 12 giugno 2026, n. 100, converted by law 7 agosto 2026, n. 145, by which Italy implemented the European Pact on Migration and Asylum, did not touch it. And art. 13, paragraph 1, of Directive (EU) 2024/1346, to be transposed by 12 June 2026, provides that the physical and mental health of detained applicants with special reception needs shall be of primary concern to national authorities, and that such applicants shall not be detained where detention would put their physical and mental health at serious risk.
A prohibition on detaining those who are unfit presupposes that someone first assesses fitness. Removing the assessment means emptying the prohibition, in other words disapplying the law by an act of the Minister. In the hierarchy of sources, a ministerial directive is an administrative act: it may organise the implementation of the law, not derogate from it. Indeed, as early as 2017 the Court of Cassation set aside the validation of a detention made subject to a health assessment to be carried out afterwards, holding that the assessment of compatibility is an essential condition for the validity of detention and must precede validation (Cass. civ., sez. VI, ord. n. 15106 del 2017).
The Minister knew this too. In his letter to La Verità of 5 October 2026, published on the Viminale website, he wrote that in addition to the directive there are assessment obligations deriving from primary sources, from the law, from European law and from international conventions, that abolishing the prior examination could not and should not abolish health safeguards, and that the outcome would have to withstand scrutiny by the courts. A month later he signed a text that removes precisely the assessment required by those primary sources.
For foreign nationals who have not applied for protection, the result is the same. Art. 15 of Directive 2008/115/EC allows detention only where less coercive measures are insufficient, and art. 16, paragraph 3, requires particular attention to the situation of vulnerable persons, as well as emergency health care and essential treatment of illness. Detention ordered without asking whether the person can bear it does not pass any proportionality test. And the European Court of Human Rights has recalled for a quarter of a century that the State, when it deprives someone of their liberty, is responsible for their health and well-being (Kudła v. Poland, 2000) and that detaining a seriously ill person in unsuitable conditions may amount to inhuman or degrading treatment prohibited by art. 3 of the Convention (Mouisel v. France, 2002).
The requirement of a statutory basis circumvented, once again
The second defect is constitutional, and concerns the method even before the content. Art. 13, second paragraph, of the Constitution requires the law to establish the cases and the manner in which personal liberty may be restricted. Since 2001 the Constitutional Court has held that the detention of foreign nationals affects personal liberty (judgment no. 105 of 2001). By judgment no. 96 of 2025 it went further: it found art. 14, comma 2, of the Consolidated Act on Immigration wholly inadequate to define the rights of detainees, observed that referring the matter to regulations and administrative acts circumvents the safeguarding function of the requirement of a statutory basis and allows the manner of detention to be regulated differently across the country, and expressly indicated the provision of health care among the matters to be regulated by law. Unable to fill the gap on its own, it called on the legislature to fulfil its unavoidable duty to act. By judgment no. 40 of 2026 it reaffirmed that all detention deprives persons of liberty and renewed its call.
Sixteen months have passed. Parliament has not written that law. The Government, instead of proposing it, has used a ministerial directive to change precisely the health safeguard, that is, the core of the manner of detention that the Court said could not be left to the administration. It is hard to imagine a more eloquent confirmation of the defect denounced by the Consulta: a fundamental right of persons deprived of liberty that changes overnight, by decision of a minister, without a vote of the Chambers and without a published text. It is no coincidence that the Court censured precisely art. 21, comma 8, of d.P.R. n. 394 del 1999, which leaves the arrangements for care and assistance services in the centres to the provisions of the prefects and to the directives issued by the Minister of the Interior: the directive of 3 November is the offspring of that referral, that is, of the very instrument that the Consulta found inadequate to satisfy the requirement of a statutory basis. In addition, there is art. 10, second paragraph, of the Constitution, which reserves to the law, in conformity with international rules and treaties, the legal status of foreign nationals.
Health reduced to a matter of logistics
The third defect concerns art. 32 of the Constitution. Health is a fundamental right of the individual, not of the citizen, and the Constitutional Court has recognised an irreducible core of protection even for irregular foreign nationals (judgment no. 252 of 2001). The directive replaces clinical compatibility with organisational manageability: what matters is no longer whether the person can be locked up without harm, but whether the centre can administer their treatment. A man with a serious psychiatric disorder can receive medication even behind bars; what the directive no longer wants to know is whether those bars make his illness worse.
Moreover, the assessment passes to someone who lacks the independence to make it. The managing body's doctor works for the private entity that won the contract to run the centre, and is now the only one who can report a case as unmanageable. This is the situation that medical ethics calls dual loyalty, and it should call for more safeguards, not fewer.
Finally, there is an argument of reasonableness, which brings art. 3 of the Constitution into play. The Code of Criminal Procedure prohibits custody in prison of a defendant suffering from a particularly serious illness where the defendant's state of health is incompatible with detention (art. 275, comma 4-bis, c.p.p.). The Constitutional Court, in judgment no. 96 of 2025, recalled that detention in the centres remains free of any punitive character. It follows that a detained foreign national, who is not accused of any offence, ends up with lesser safeguards for their health than a defendant in pre-trial custody. It is an inverted hierarchy, and it has no constitutional justification.
Even more serious is the plight of victims of torture and violence. Art. 17, comma 1, of d.lgs. n. 142 del 2015 lists them among vulnerable persons, and for asylum applicants vulnerability incompatible with detention prevents their admission to the centre. The directive moves the search for those signs to after admission, entrusting it to the managing body's doctor and to photographic documentation of injuries. But torture and trafficking often leave no visible scars: they leave post-traumatic disorders, dissociation and psychological suffering, which can be recognised only with time, specialist skills and linguistic mediation, as required by the Istanbul Protocol and the 2017 guidelines of the Ministry of Health. Those who bear no photographable marks on their body risk being considered healthy and therefore locked up.
There remains the question of the first twenty-four hours. If the person enters the centre without an examination, who is responsible for what happens during that time, when no one knows whether they are diabetic, have a heart condition, are in withdrawal or in the midst of a psychotic crisis? The text, in the passages made public, does not say.
The judge without the papers
Detention must be validated by a judge within very short time limits, as required by art. 13, third paragraph, of the Constitution. Previously, the fitness certificate was in the file and was submitted to the judge. Now the full form goes in a sealed envelope to the managing body's doctor, while the summary assessment remains with the police office and reaches the judge only if the judge asks for it. A review that depends on requesting a document whose existence the judge may not know of is not an effective review, and the right of defence under art. 24, together with the fair trial guarantees of art. 111, amounts to little if defence counsel has to chase the papers within forty-eight hours. Protection was already fragile. In 2024 the Court of Cassation, while recalling that art. 3, comma 7, of the 2022 directive required the certificate to be in the file submitted to the validation judge, ruled out that its absence alone made the measure null where the detainee raises nothing about their health, specifying however that, if a specific health ground is raised, the judge has a duty to obtain the documentation and assess it (Cass. civ., sez. I, ord. n. 13180 del 2024). The new directive also eliminates that 2022 rule and makes the judge's request the only channel through which health information reaches the hearing.
Secrecy, presented as protection of medical confidentiality, also risks becoming opacity towards those whose institutional task is to monitor places of deprivation of liberty. The list of exceptions does not mention the local ombudspersons or members of Parliament, and in any case a directive cannot restrict powers of access and oversight that are grounded in the law.
The courts were asking for more checks, not fewer
The directive comes at a time when case law was moving in the opposite direction. The Rome Court of Appeal, by decree of 12 November 2025 (R.G. n. 5967/2025), refused to validate the detention of an asylum applicant who was taking an antipsychotic and was dependent on substances, observing that the fitness certificate had not considered those conditions, that specialist examinations had not been carried out despite defence counsel's reports to the managing body and the local health authority, and that an adequate certificate of compatibility was therefore lacking. The same Court added that, after judgment no. 96 of 2025, the absence of statutory rules on the manner of detention has a concrete impact on the right to health and renders detention unlawful as early as the validation stage.
Even a ruling favourable to the administration confirms the point. By judgment no. 1064 of 2026 the First Criminal Section of the Court of Cassation set aside without referral a refusal to validate, because the Court of Appeal had considered the person fragile without engaging with the report of the fitness examination, which ruled out conditions incompatible with a closed community, and required the assessment of the detainee's health to be based on established clinical parameters and on an adequate body of evidence. That body of evidence was the assessment of compatibility. By removing it, the directive deprives the judge of the only clinical assessment on which to base the decision, one way or the other, and makes review more uncertain for everyone, the State included.
The same applies to the Council of State. In judgment no. 7839 of 2025 it specified that the operators of the centres must comply with the 2022 directive even when the tender specifications do not refer to it, and asked for the specifications to be brought more closely into line precisely with art. 3, comma 4, that is, with the new assessment by the local health authority when signs of incompatibility emerge. By its decision of 8 July 2026, in enforcement proceedings, it found that the Ministry had merely aligned the specifications formally with the directive, without any real inquiry into health and psychological care and suicide prevention, and ordered it to carry out a review by January 2027. Amending today the provision on which that final judgment was built, before the review has been carried out, also exposes the directive to the objection of circumventing a final judgment, which art. 21-septies of law n. 241 del 1990 sanctions with nullity.
The stated reasons do not hold up
The Minister explained that he wished to prevent assessments driven by ideological prejudice from obstructing returns, and the directive comes after the investigation by the Ravenna Public Prosecutor's Office into doctors accused of issuing false certificates. But these are accusations, covered by the presumption of innocence under art. 27 of the Constitution, and on 13 October the Court of Cassation set aside the suspension from practice ordered against some of the women under investigation. If a certificate is false, the Criminal Code punishes it; a health safeguard is not abolished for everyone because someone is suspected of having abused it. The same applies to cases in which the examination is refused: the refusal could have been regulated, without abolishing the assessment of compatibility.
Nor is the argument about separating the medical act from the administrative decision convincing. Separation is fine, provided that someone, and ultimately the judge, decides on compatibility on the basis of a clinical assessment. The directive does not move the assessment: it eliminates it.
Finally, there remains a contradiction that the Ministry will have to explain: the Council of State ordered it to verify, together with the Ministry of Health and the National Ombudsperson, how detained persons are currently cared for, and before even doing so the Ministry lowers the safeguards.
What changes in practice
For those at risk of detention, and for their families, the first thing to know is that the law has not changed. The prohibition on detaining persons whose health conditions are incompatible remains written in art. 7, comma 5, of d.lgs. n. 142 del 2015, and the principle of proportionality applies to everyone. It is important to bring, or to send to defence counsel, every available medical document: diagnoses, treatments, specialists' certificates, emergency department reports.
The validation judge is subject to the law, not to the Minister's directives, and applies administrative acts only insofar as they comply with the law, as required by art. 5 of law 20 marzo 1865, n. 2248, annex E. It is for the judge to verify whether the person's health is compatible with detention, ordering examinations if necessary, and to disapply the directive insofar as it excludes that assessment.
The lawyer's role in these hearings becomes even more decisive. In the light of the case law of the Court of Cassation, the client's health conditions must always be raised specifically, with the available documentation, because it is the specific allegation that gives rise to the judge's duty to obtain and assess the medical records; known conditions must be reported immediately in writing to the managing body and the local health authority, requesting specialist examinations; the full medical form and the summary assessment must be requested; the lack of an assessment of compatibility and admission to the centre without an examination must be raised, and release from detention requested where the assessment is missing or merely apparent, as the Rome Court of Appeal did. Before the validation judge, the question of the constitutionality of art. 14 of the Consolidated Act on Immigration may be raised again, insofar as it does not regulate by law the manner of detention and the protection of health: a warning from the Court that has gone unheeded does not end the matter, it is often its premise. Anyone can ask the Ministry, through the civic access under art. 5, comma 1, of d.lgs. n. 33 del 2013, to publish the directive. Representative bodies can challenge it before the administrative courts, as has already happened successfully with ministerial acts on the centres, and invoke in enforcement proceedings the conflict with what the Council of State ordered; and, for harm suffered during detention, interim relief under art. 700 c.p.c. remains available, as does an action for damages, which the Constitutional Court has described as the minimum instrument of constitutionally necessary judicial protection.
A State governed by the rule of law does not measure a person's health by their usefulness for the purposes of return. The person comes before the procedure, and fundamental rights are not suspended at the door of a pre-removal detention centre: they must be protected always and for everyone, all the more so for those deprived of liberty without having committed any offence.
Avv. Giuseppe MARIANI
Potenza, 9 November 2026
Legislative references: arts. 3, 10, second paragraph, 13, 24, 27, 32, 111 and 117, first paragraph, Cost.; art. 14 d.lgs. 25 luglio 1998, n. 286; art. 21, comma 8, d.P.R. 31 agosto 1999, n. 394; arts. 7, comma 5, and 17, comma 1, d.lgs. 18 agosto 2015, n. 142; d.l. 12 giugno 2026, n. 100, converted by l. 7 agosto 2026, n. 145; arts. 5, comma 1, and 12 d.lgs. 14 marzo 2013, n. 33; art. 21-septies l. 7 agosto 1990, n. 241; art. 275, comma 4-bis, c.p.p.; art. 700 c.p.c.; art. 5 l. 20 marzo 1865, n. 2248, annex E; arts. 15 and 16 Directive 2008/115/EC; art. 13 Directive (EU) 2024/1346; arts. 3 and 5 ECHR; art. 3 directive of the Minister of the Interior of 19 May 2022; directive of the Minister of the Interior of 3 November 2026.
Precedents cited: Corte cost., sentt. n. 105 del 2001, n. 252 del 2001, n. 96 del 2025 and n. 40 del 2026; Cass. civ., sez. VI, ord. n. 15106 del 2017; Cass. civ., sez. I, ord. n. 13180 of 14 May 2024; Cass. pen., sez. I, sent. n. 1064 of 12 January 2026; Cons. Stato, sez. III, 7 October 2025, n. 7839; Cons. Stato, decision of 8 July 2026 in enforcement proceedings; Rome Court of Appeal, section for persons, family, minors and international protection, decree of 12 November 2025, R.G. n. 5967/2025; ECtHR, Grand Chamber, 26 October 2000, Kudła v. Poland, application no. 30210/96; ECtHR, 14 November 2002, Mouisel v. France, application no. 67263/01; ECtHR, Grand Chamber, 15 December 2016, Khlaifia and Others v. Italy, application no. 16483/12.
The commentary is for information purposes only and does not constitute legal advice on any specific case.