The ruling
Constitutional Court (Corte costituzionale), order no. 175 of 2026, decided on 8 July 2026 and filed on 22 October 2026. President AMOROSO, drafting judge NAVARRETTA
“whether art. 12, paragraph 2, letter d), of Directive (EU) 2011/98 [...] must be interpreted as meaning that the intention to derogate from equal treatment must be expressly formulated in the text of the legislation implementing the directive, or as allowing a clear intention to derogate to be inferred also from what is expressly clarified in the explanatory report to the legislative decree and, more generally, in the preparatory works of the legislative text”
Preliminary question referred to the Court of Justice of the European Union under art. 267 TFEU, point 1 of the operative part.
The case
With Regional Law no. 2 of 2024, Piedmont amended the requirements for access to public residential housing (edilizia residenziale pubblica), requiring third-country nationals, in addition to lawful residence, to be engaged in regular employment, following the model of art. 40, comma 6, of the Consolidated Immigration Act (D. Lgs. 286/1998), and awarding increasing points for residence in the Region lasting fifteen, twenty or twenty-five years. Applying those rules, the housing management body excluded from the rankings foreign applicants who did not have a current job.
An anti-discrimination action followed, brought under art. 28 of D. Lgs. 150/2011 by A.S.G.I., by a foreign national and by a number of trade unions and tenants’ organisations against the Region and the housing management body. The Court of Turin (Tribunale di Torino), first civil section, by order of 4 November 2025 raised a question of constitutional legitimacy, considering the employment requirement unreasonable in relation to a benefit that meets housing needs, and in conflict with the equal treatment guaranteed by Directives 2011/98/EU and 2003/109/EC.
The decision
The Court does not decide the merits, and says so expressly: it examines first the questions concerning EU law and reserves every other aspect, including procedural ones, among them the question of the points linked to residence.
The reasoning is straightforward. Art. 12, paragraph 1, letter g), of the Single Permit Directive guarantees third-country workers, both those who entered for work and those admitted for other reasons but authorised to work, equal treatment in access to goods and services, including procedures for obtaining housing. Paragraph 2, letter d), however, allows Member States to restrict that equal treatment, reserving it to those who are actually in employment and restricting access to housing assistance. The two differences between the Italian rule and the directive, namely the permit of at least two years and current employment instead of the mere authorisation to work, would therefore in the abstract be covered by the derogation, provided that the derogation has been exercised.
And this is the crux. The Court of Justice has repeatedly held that derogations must be interpreted restrictively and that the State must clearly express its intention to rely on them, so that a rule predating transposition cannot, on its own, count as an exercise of that option (CJEU, Case C-449/16, Martinez Silva; CJEU, Case C-571/10, Kamberaj), and the Constitutional Court itself had drawn the consequences in the field of family benefits (Corte cost., sent. n. 54 del 2022). Art. 40, comma 6, predates the directive, and D. Lgs. 40/2014, which transposed it, left it untouched. However, the explanatory report and the concordance table of that decree indicate precisely art. 40, comma 6, as the implementation of the derogation, and the opinion of the XIV Committee of the Chamber of Deputies points in the same direction.
The intention to derogate, then, is there: it is simply not written in the text of the law. Is that enough? The courts of merit have been divided, with the Court of Milan holding that the derogation was validly exercised and the Court of Appeal of Venice, the Court of Cremona and the Court of Bologna disapplying the rule. The Constitutional Court, while acknowledging that the explanatory report has an interpretative function, considers that whether the “clear expression” required by the Court of Justice must be textual is a question of interpretation of EU law, and refers it to Luxembourg, staying the proceedings.
The commentary
The order is an example of dialogue between the Courts conducted with restraint, and the choice to make the reference was, on closer inspection, inevitable. But the question put by the Constitutional Court already betrays how difficult it is to give an answer favourable to the State.
The explanatory report to a legislative decree is not law. It does not bind the interpreter, it cannot be known by those to whom the rule is addressed with the same immediacy as the Official Gazette, and above all it says nothing to the foreign national who, reading the call for applications of their municipality, wants to know whether or not they are entitled to a home. Recital 32 of the directive allows States to accompany transposition with explanatory documents, but a document that explains a rule cannot make up for a rule that is missing. If the derogation is an exception to a right, and equal treatment is one, requiring the exception to be written where the rules are written does not seem a formalism: it is the minimum condition for that right to be knowable and enforceable.
There is also an aspect that the order leaves in the background and which deserves attention. Even if the derogation were considered validly exercised, it allows equal treatment to be reserved to those who work, not to turn social housing into a reward for those who have been working longer or have lived in the same Region for decades. The points linked to residence of fifteen, twenty or twenty-five years, which the Court has reserved, are a separate and no less delicate issue, on which constitutional case law on long-residence requirements has already spoken clearly.
Finally, there remains in the background the issue of the power of the ordinary courts to disapply directly a domestic rule that conflicts with the directive: this is why, in the meantime, the courts of merit will continue to go their separate ways.
What changes in practice
For citizens. A foreign national who is lawfully resident in Italy and has been excluded from a social housing ranking solely because they did not have a current job at the time of the application should not take the exclusion as final. The question is pending before the Court of Justice, and the time limits for challenging the call for applications or the ranking continue to run: it is advisable to have the measure examined straight away, keeping the application, the residence permit and the notice of exclusion.
For colleagues. The order should be cited in anti-discrimination actions under art. 28 of D. Lgs. 150/2011 against regional and municipal calls for applications that reproduce the requirement of art. 40, comma 6, seeking primarily disapplication on the basis of the Venice, Cremona and Bologna precedents and, in the alternative, a direct preliminary reference or a stay of proceedings pending the decision of the Court of Justice. It should be checked, case by case, whether the call requires a permit of at least two years or current employment, and whether the exclusion concerns a holder of a single permit or a long-term resident, because for the latter the benchmark is Directive 2003/109/EC and the reasoning on the derogation is different. The public administrations, for their part, would do well not to build new calls rigidly around a requirement whose soundness is today anything but certain.
Avv. Giuseppe MARIANI
Potenza, 24 October 2026
Legislative references: art. 40, comma 6, D. Lgs. 286/1998; D. Lgs. 40/2014; art. 12 of Directive 2011/98/EU; art. 11 of Directive 2003/109/EC; art. 28 D. Lgs. 150/2011; art. 267 TFEU.
Precedents cited: Corte cost., sent. n. 54 del 2022; CJEU, Cases C-449/16 (Martinez Silva), C-571/10 (Kamberaj), C-350/20 (O.D.), C-302/19, C-94/20 (Land Oberösterreich), all cited in the order.
The commentary is for information purposes only and does not constitute legal advice on any specific case.